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Abstract
The paper conjectures that the high unemployment of the Western economies has been produced by
the decline of the private house-rental market and the rise of home-ownership.  Evidence is
provided for the developed nations, the states of the USA, and the regions of the UK, Italy, France
and Sweden.  Although its calculations should be viewed as tentative, the paper's results imply that
a 10 percentage point rise in the owner-occupation rate is associated with an increase of
approximately 2 percentage points in the unemployment rate.  This would be sufficient to explain a
significant part of the rise in joblessness in the industrialized countries.   
A Conjecture on the Explanation for High Unemployment
in the Industrialized Nations: Part I
   1.     Introduction   
Approximately 30 million people are officially unemployed in the OECD economies.  This
is more than ten per cent of the workforce, and many times the figure of the early 1960s.
Explaining the secular rise in unemployment has proved difficult.
The problem seems worth solving.  Although a few economists may believe that people are
content to live on the dole, much anecdotal evidence suggests that joblessness is a large source of
unhappiness in society.  This view is supported by most of the recent cross-section and panel
estimation of 'happiness equations' (the literature includes Bjorklund, 1985; Clark and Oswald,
1994; Blanchflower et al, 1993).  These reveal, as commonsense indicates, that being without a
job appears to be associated with markedly low levels of well-being. 
A successful solution to the puzzle of unemployment demands that a number of
requirements be met.
1.  The explanation should make theoretical sense.
2.  It ought to explain why a small number of Western countries, such as Switzerland and the
USA, managed to escape almost any rise in unemployment between the end of World War II and
the 1990s.
3.  It should help us understand why countries such as Spain, Finland and Ireland have especially
high rates of unemployment (of around 15%-20%).
4.  It needs to make sense of the fact that unemployment rates have increased relative to vacancies,
and that it is unemployment durations, rather than inflow rates, that have risen.
5.  It must explain -- harking back to Robert Hall's question in 1970 -- why Canada and the USA
used thirty years ago to have approximately the highest rates of unemployment among the
industrialized countries, and why the US is now a low-unemployment nation and Canada in the
2middle of the unemployment ranking.
6.  It should draw upon, and in turn help explain, the reason why unemployment differs across the
regions within a country (Lindbeck, 1990, p.300).
7.  The answer should probably be a supply-side one -- perhaps the discovery of a "wage
pressure" variable.
8.  It should tell us whether the intensively-studied Nordic countries uccessfully had low
unemployment in the 1980s because of their centralized pay systems, and make sense of Bentolila
and Blanchard's (1990) observation that the economic structure of high-unemployment Spain and
low-unemployment Portugal appear puzzlingly similar.
9.  It ought to be consistent with both time-series and cross-section evidence.
10.  It should offer implications for unemployment policy.
The paper tries to address these concerns. 
The paper conjectures that mass unemployment exists because of a secular change that has
happened in all but a few Western housing markets -- the rise of home ownership and the decline
in private renting.  Damage to the labour market is then what might be expected if workers in
owner-occupied homes are relatively immobile.  Western governments' long-running attempts to
raise the degree of home-ownership may thus inadvertently have worsened the efficiency of labour
markets.  In almost any model of the labour market, a decline in labour mobility, or rise in 'mis-
match', can be expected to raise the equilibrium rate of unemployment.   
There turn out to be difficulties in collecting long runs of appropriately comparable
international data on home ownership rates.  That may account for the lack of research along the
lines proposed in later sections.  The paper has instead to combine evidence from a number of
fairly small data sets.
   2.      Background   
Research on unemployment has over recent years been dominated by two approaches.  The
3first is the decade's worth of work of Richard Layard, Steve Nickell and Richard Jackman (as
especially in Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991).  The second is the work on unemployment
dynamics by authors such as Blanchard and Summers (1986).  Closely related to these strands of
thought come the analysis of insiders and outsiders by Lindbeck and Snower (1988) and the non-
competitive models of Phelps (1994).  Papers like Grossman and Hart (1981) show how
unemployment can be generated in a partial equilibrum 'contract' setting, and this is involuntary in
the real-world case where unemployment insurance is less than complete (Oswald, 1986); but it is
not clear how such models would predict secularly rising unemployment.  Newer approaches
include Bentolila and Bertola (1990).  Bean (1994) provides an overview of the field; Junankar and
Madsen (1994 and Manning (1994) offer critiques of established work. 
A theme through most of this research is the idea of hysteresis.  While every economist
accepts that unemployment follows an autoregressive process, it might be believed that the
profession has turned to hysteresis models as a last resort.  The evidence for them is slender.
First, hysteresis models that rely on the disenfranchisement of the long-term unemployed appear to
have the counter-factual prediction that unemployment should have climbed steadily over the last
thousand years.  The same is true of some insider-outsider union models.  Second, those who
argue for hysteresis reasons that the European nations could, if sufficiently determined,
permanantly reflate their way out of recession, need to explain why the pan-European expansion in
the late 1980s, which in some countries (such as the UK) was so strong that it created the greatest
house price-spiral since the 1950s, failed to cut unemployment substantially.  Third, the
econometric evidence for long-term unemployment variables in wage equations is largely confined
to small time-series regressions.  Inherently more powerful cross-sections tests, using jobless rates
across regions, have not produced much support for the theory (Christofides and Oswald, 1992;
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994). Fourth, an extended period of anti-union legislation in
countries like the UK has not had dramatic effects on unemployment.  These points raise doubts
about the ability of hysteresis theory to provide a complete xplanation for the history of
unemployment. 
4Evidence for a number of other pieces of the unemployment puzzle is presented in Oswald
(1995).  One is that data from the Eurobarometer Surveys suggest that the reported well-being of
the unemployed has not increased, relative to those in jobs, since the early 1970s.  Another is that
microeconometric research seems to indicate that the degree of wage flexibility is approximately the
same across nations.  These findings make it hard to accept a number of theories of high
unemployment.  If it were true that generous levels of unemployment benefit were causing
voluntary joblessness in the West, then it is not clear that those without jobs would systematically
report (much) lower well-being levels than those in work.  A more subtle way to argue is that
unemployment is involuntary but unemployment benefits have made it easier to be jobless.
Secularly rising unemployment might then have been induced -- perhaps thanks to an increasingly
sophisticated welfare state -- by secularly declining unpleasantness from being unemployed.  But
reported well-being data, on hundreds of thousands of randomly sampled Europeans in the
Eurobarometer Surveys, do not support that view.  The 'unhappiness gap' appears to have stayed
constant since the early 1970s.  Further evidence comes from research described in Blanchflower
and Oswald (1994a, b).  If it were really different degrees of wage-flexibility that explained, say,
Japan's good unemployment performance, the US's reasonable unemployment performance and
Britain's poor unemployment performance, there would be no reason to think that estimates of
wage rigidity in the three countries would come out identical.  Yet with microeconometric methods
apparently they do.
Given the above arguments, it might be argued that wage flexibility is similar across
countries, unemployment is involuntary, and the rise in unemployment is not easily attributed to
some change in the levels of unemployment benefits.   
3.    An     Alternative    Approach                   
If hysteresis models are not the answer, it is necessary to consider other approaches.  An
alternative way to think is that there is some missing secularly-trended variable.  A natural
5possibility is that somehow the labour markets of the West have become ossified by a reduction in
the ability of firms and workers to 'match', or by some growing impediment to mobility. 
The difficulties with such a view ar  practical rather than conceptual.  First, no such
variable seems to have been found.  Perhaps the main candidate at the time of writing (favoured
by, for example, Richard Layard) is unemployment benefit levels or durations.  These are difficult
to define consistently across nations.  One of the most systematic attempts has been made by the
OECD in their 1994 Jobs Study, and it reveals that low-unemployment Switzerland has a benefit
replacement ratio in excess of that in, for example, high-unemployment Great Britain.  The British
replacement ratio was also calculated to have declined since the mid-1970s.  Moreover, the
persuasiveness of all kinds of benefit-rooted arguments i hampered by the evident distress
suffered by unemployed people, and many nations have recently been cutting real benefits but have
not wrought obvious transformations of their labour markets.  Finally, ven if some positive
correlation between benefits and unemployment rates is found, there are reasons to believe that
causality might be difficult to determine.  Di Tella and MacCulloch (1996) show that in the
industrialized countries the generosity of benefits is moulded, through a political process, by the
amount of unemployment.  Second, given the cyclical shocks from oil prices and other forces that
hit the major economies in the period, it is not easy to disentangle cycle from time trend.  Third, if
the aim is to uncover a trended variable that rises more strongly in some nations than others,
researchers do not have access to a large number of degrees of freedom.  In a sense, there is only a
single observation for each country.  Here, however, looking across regions within a country
might be able to help. 
One way to conceptualize equilibrium is to adopt the framework proposed by writers such
as Rowthorn (1997), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), and Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991).  In
one log-linear efficiency-wage variant, for example, there are three equations:
ln w = ln b  + g(øU) No-shirking condition (1)
µ = c(w, r, po) Zero profit condition (2)
b = b(µ) Government benefit rule (3)
6where w is the wage, b is unemployment benefits, ø is a search-effectivenes parameter, U is the
unemployment rate, µ is the level of technology, r is a rental rate on capital, po is the pr ce of
energy or other inputs, g(.) is the structure of a no-shirking condition, c(...) is a unit miminum
cost function, and b(µ) the government's unemployment-benefiting rule. This particular variant
follows Carruth et al (1996). 
These equations are all in real terms. First, a no-shirking condition must hold.  Second,
employers must be earning zero supernormal profits.  Third, real unemployment benefits, perhaps
financed by lump sum taxes, must be adjusted in line with some measure of the level of the
economy's technology.
This model implies that the equilibrium unemployment rate, U*, is given by a function of
the structural characteristics and real prices in the economy.  In particular, the equilibrium rate of
joblessness depends upon search effectiveness, the real interest rate, real oil price, and the real
value of being unemployed.  Hence the 'natural rate' of unemployment is
U*= U*(ø, r, po, b(µ)) Equilibrium unemployment (4)
A rise in the first variable will reduce unemployment.  A rise in any of the last three variables will
increase unemployment.  In the case of the real interest rate and real oil price, this is because, in
order to restore zero profits after an upward shock to r or po, the wage has to be bid down, and
this in turn requires in long run equilibrium an increased rate of unemployment.  Some economists
argue that even r and po drop out in the long run.
The search effectiveness parameter, ø, is essentially an inverse wage pressure variable.  As
it falls, the equilibrium unemployment rate rises.
   4.      Some    Elementary     Evidence    for       Nations   
One factor that is likely to influence job search and mobility, and thus the ø parameter, is
the type of housing in which a worker lives.  It is known that those who live in rented public-
sector housing are less likely to move regions or leave the pool of unemployment (see the long line
7of research by Hughes and McCormick, 1981, 1985, 987, and McCormick, 1983; see also
Bover, Muellabauer and Murphy, 1988, who study links between housing and the labour market,
though concentrating on house prices).  Intuition suggests that the same might be true of home-
owners.  If owning a house reduces an individual's mobility -- as this paper was being written-up I
received a copy of Henley (1996) which appears to find exactly that -- then the consequences for
the labour market of secularly rising home-ownership could be profound.  A small piece of
evidence consistent with this way of thinking is in the work of Wadsworth (1995) which reveals,
in the author's Table 6, that private renters have a notably fast outflow rate from unemployment
into jobs. 
Most industrialized nations have recently experienced growth in home-ownership.  Two
exceptions are Switzerland and the US.  Ireland, Finland, Greece and Spain currently have among
the highest rates of owner-occupied housing in the world.  The unemployment rates in Table 3
suggest these facts are the simplest reason to wonder whether there is some link between the
housing and labour markets. 
It is natural to begin with the early 1960s, when there was not thought to be a problem with
the labour market (except in North America, paradoxically, which failed to have the 2%-3%
unemployment rates of the European countries).  Figure 1 reveals a simple pattern.  It covers a
dozen representative nations; comparable data could not be obtained on others.  A line of best fit is
included.  Although the Table has fewer countries than would be desirable, th re is a simple
positive correlation between the amount of home ownership, h, in a nation and its unemployment
percentage, u.  The slope of the line, namely, du/dh, is 0.14, which means that a 10 percentage
point rise in home ownership would be associated with an increase of approximately 1.4
percentage points in joblessness.  Given the small data set that has to be used in this kind of
calculation, the paper does not report standard errors. 
Table 1 tabulates the raw data.  The two countries in the sample with the highest owner-
occcupier percentages in the 1960s had, at that time, the highest and third-highest unemployment
rates, respectively.  These nations are Canada and the US.
8Some alternative correlations with unemployment are shown in Table 2.  The literature's
main contenders as explanatory factors in the puzzle of high unemployment ar  the degree of
corporatism, the unemployment benefit replacement ratio, the density of unionism, and the
duration of unemployment benefits offered by countries.  Discussions are provided by McCallum
(1983), Freeman (1988), Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), and Calmfors (1993, 1994).  For
the 1960s, however, these factors are statistically weak.
Today's data reveal the same general pattern as thirty years ago.  In Figure 2, a cross-
section correlation for the 1990s is shown.  There are now 18 countries and thus eighteen points
on the Figure.  A best-fitting line allows the gradient of unemployment to owner-occupation (that
is, du/dh) to be calculated.  It is 0.22, compared to 0.14 in the previous Figure.  This means that,
in principle, an increase of 10 percentage points of owner-occupation would tend to add another
2.2 percentage points on to joblessness.  Table 3 gives the raw information.  It also has statistics
on empoyment-to-population rates by country.  Figure 3 is a plot.  This is a useful check on the
two other Figures, because it could be argued that male labour force participation is a cleaner
indicator of the demand for labour than is the unemployment rate.  Countries with high home-
ownership have low male employment-to-population ratios.  Figure 3's findings are much the
same as with the unemployment variable.  For good measure, Figure 4 ascertains that the
suspiciously helpful-looking Swiss data point is not contributing too much to the negative
correlation.
A more interesting kind of evidence would be to establish the same relationship in changes
rather than levels.  This is for the usual reason that cross-section patterns are likely to be dominated
by fixed effects.  Figures 5 and 6 do this.  Figure 5 plots the 20-year decline in (male)
employment/population for each nation against the 20-year change in owner occupation.  Figure 6
plots the 20-year change in unemployment for each nation against the 20-year change in owner
occupation.
Figure 5 reveals that the countries with the largest rises in home ownership also had the
largest falls in male employment/population ratios.  What is noticeable about Figure 6 is the
9gradient rather than the not-unexpected spread of the observations.  As the estimated equation is
unemployment rate = 3.1 + 0.19 home owner rate, its slope du/dh is almost the same as for the
pure cross-section for 1990 in Figure 3.  While it is possible this is chance, or some artifact of
omitted variables, it seems of interest.
Is it possible, it might be asked, that this effect of du/dh is big enough to explain the secular
increase in joblessness in many Western countries?  A natural example to consider is the United
Kingdom.  The facts for that nation are plotted in Figure A1 of the appendix, which shows the
upward movement in both series over three decades.  As can be seen from the appendix, the last
few decades have witnessed a rise of nearly 30 percentage points in the extent of owner-occupation
in the UK.  If the appropriate multiple is one of 0.2, therefore, this might explain nearly 6
percentage points of extra unemployment. 
A hypothetical home-ownership effect is thus insufficient to explain the whole of the rise in
joblessness in a country like the UK, but enough to explain the bulk of it.  That may appear a
paradoxical conclusion when UK unemployment exceeded 11% at its peak.  But some joblessness
is attributable to temporary shocks like the high real oil price that prevailed through the beginning
of the 1980s; sources include Bruno and Sachs (1985), Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), and
Carruth, Hooker and Oswald (1995).  The aim here is instead to uncover an underlying trend
variable.
   5.      Evidence    for    the      US    States   and      UK     Regions:    Plots    and     Panel    Data    Estimates
Following the kind of methodology advocated in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) and
Blanchard and Katz (1997), it may be possible to address these macroeconomic issues by using
regional data (thereby viewing areas as mini macroeconomies).  
The Statistical Abstract of the United States makes that possible.  Figure 7 presents the
scatter of observation between the 20-year change in State unemployment and State home-
ownership.  In this case, with 51 observations, it is worth recording the t-statistic on the coefficient
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of home ownership, which is slightly greater than 2.  The gradient of the equation is du/dh =
0.12501.  This is only a little smaller than in earlier estimates for other countries.
A similar picture is provided in Figure 8, which looks at changes in UK regional
unemployment.  Again 20-year differences are employed.  Hence the change in EastAnglia's
unemployment rate between 1971 and 1990 is charted against the change in East Anglia's owner
occupation rate between those two years, and so on for each area.  There are few data points, so
Figure 8 cannot be taken too seriously.  Nevertheless, the estimated gradient is 0.21.
A more formal kind of evidence is contained in Tables 4 and 5, which provides
regressions on panels of US states and UK regions.  There appears to be a case for estimating such
equations by simple LSDV, or an equivalent, rather than a simultaneous equations method.  It is
not easy to see why home ownership might be a positively increasing function of unemployment.
If anything, the reverse seems more plausible, so LSDV may even give downward-biased
estimates.  It is not clear what an appropriate instrument for home ownership might be in an
unemployment equation.  Issues of simultaneity may, however, have to be tackled in future
research. 
In Table 4, the data are for the 51 States from the mid-1980s to the middle of the 1990s.
For reasons of data consistency, the period is different from that in Figure 7.  After dropping some
observations to allow for lags, there are 510 observations.  The estimation method is fixed effects
LSDV, where a separate dummy is included for each state.  Year dummies are also incorporated.
A lagged dependent variable (Ut-1) is included, along with three lags on the home ownership rate
in the state.  GMM results were similar.
Column 1 of Table 4 reveals that, as expected, there is a substantial amount of
autoregression in unemployment.  The lagged dependent variable enters with a coefficient of
approximately 0.75.  The largest coefficient on housing, h, is that on period t-2, which is two
years earlier.  The implied long-run gradient in Table 4, column 1, can be examined by solving for
the steady state.  It  is (1 - 0.7527)-1(0.0028 + 0.0490), which is approximately 0.21.  That is the
same kind of relationship between unemployment and home ownership as emerged from the
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simpler method, namely, the 20-year differences in Figure 7.  The F test on the significance of the
area fixed effects suggests that there could be a case for omitting them.  This might be viewed as
consistent with the finding in various parts of the paper that cross-section and differenced estimates
give similar results. 
Equation 2, the second column of Table 4, is estimated partly in logs but has similar
implications.  The long-run elasticity of u with respect to h is approximately 2.  Hence an increase
of a half in the proportion of owner-occupiers would be associated with a doubling of
unemployment.
For the UK, there are equivalent results.  One idea is needed.  By definition, where h is the
percentage of home owners, r is the proportion of private renters, and s is the proportion of social-
housing renters, the differential linking changes is dh + dr + ds = 0.  Neglecting ds, then, dh can
be treated as equivalent to -dr.  Because of the large degree of publicly-rented housing in the
United Kingdom, the regressions use the private renting propor on, r, rather than the home-
ownership proportion, h.  The data run from 1973 to 1994, and cover thirteen regions.  As in the
US case, there is a high degree of autoregression in unemployment.  When estimated with a single
lagged dependent variable, the coefficient on Ut-1 was 0.9.  The data favoured an AR(2) model,
however, which is what is reported in Table 5.  The two lagged dependent variables enter with
coefficients of approximately 1.6 and -0.7 respectively.  Equation 1 of Table 5 uncovers a
coefficient on private renting, r, of -0.0357 with a standard error of 0.027.  This is not an
especially well-defined coefficent.  However, the implied long-run coefficient of 0.21 is
surprisingly like that obtained for the UK using the simpler plots, and earlier for other countries.  
As in the previous United States results, in the econd column of Table 5 the largest
coefficient on housing enters lagged rather than current.  This is rt-1, with coefficient -0.12 and a
standard error of 0.4.  The implied long-run gradient in Table 5, column 2, can be examined by
solving for the steady state of an equation with two lagged dependent variables and two renter
variables.  The gradient is a large 0.398.  It is not easy to know how to interpret this estimate; it
would imply considerable effects of home ownership upon the labour market.  The F test on the
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significance of the area fixed effects once again suggests that there could be a case for omitting
them.
   6.      Further     Evidence    for     Other      Nations'     Regions   
Some modern data were also obtained, from Eurostat, for the regions of Italy, France and
Sweden.  Although cross-section correlations are inherently less reliable than those thatallow
country fixed-effects to be differenced out, Figures 9-11 plot for these nations the simple regional
correlation between home ownership and unemployment.  The estimated gradients should not be
taken too seriously because of the small samples, but they are 0.12 for France, 0.14 for Italy, and
0.15 for Sweden.  Before being swept away by the similarity across these it is useful to know that
for the US and the UK this regional cross-section correlation in levels does not hold (though it
does in time-differences).  
Figure 12 does the same for the UK.  However, the UK has unusually large amounts of
social housing organized by the public sector.  That has been growing.  Social housing may
generate the same immobilities as home ownership.  Figure 12 therefore plots the scatter of points
linking unemployment by region with the extent of private renting by region.  Thereis again
evidence consistent with the paper's thesis.  Regions of the United Kingdom with large private
rental sectors have low unemployment.  This is not inconsistent with the general ideas in a recent
overview paper by McCormick (1996), although the focus there is on how the existence of social
housing ("council housing" in the UK) might impede the mobility of workers.
   7.      Possible     Objections    and     Overview     
 This section consider objections.
A natural concern is simultaneity.  In a satisfactory general equilbrium model, home
ownership is determined endogenously alongside unemployment.  If high unemployment tends to
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discourage people from purchasing their own homes -- perhaps because they fear job-loss would
interrupt their mortgage payments -- then an econometric model of unemployment may have to
instrument the home-ownership rate.  On such a view, the estimates in this paper could understate
the impact of housing tenure on equilibrium joblessness.
A further difficulty is omitted-variable bias.  As the paper largely studies simple bivariate
correlations, such bias is likely to be relevant here, although it may be less important in the fixed-
effects estimation where region dummies can be expected to catch many of the potential variables.
Working with international cross-sections, however, inherently restricts what can be done.  One
approach, which is that taken in Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), is to estimate regressions
with large numbers of independent variables despite a small number of observations.  This can be
justified intellectually but suffers from practical problems.  It has not been adopted here.
An attraction of the paper's thesis is that it appears to provide possible answers to the ten
questions raised in the Introduction.  Explaining the Swiss case simply, which has long created
intellectual problems for investigators, is a particular advantage.  Number 8 on the list, however, is
not answered wholly convincingly.  Spanish home-ownership is considerably greater than that in
Portugal, which is a start, but the difference is not sufficient to explain the whole contrast in the
nations' jobless rates.  For the Nordic countries, the paper's id as offer an alternative to the
traditional view that unemployment has been low because of the nations' wage-setting practices.
The explanation offered in this paper might be helpful in understanding why a country like Sweden
had a low unemployment rate for so long.  That nation has traditionally had a relatively low and
stable owner-occupation rate (particularly if ownership cooperatives are excluded).  Sweden is
unusual in that it actually has a law that prevents the sale of apartments into owner occupation
(Lundqvist 1988, p.111).  It is an intruiging thought that such a law might accidentally have helped
the behaviour of the labour market.  Holmlund's (1996) evidence suggests that Sweden's now-8%
unemployment probably reflects a change in the equilibrium rate rather than a temporary demand
shock.  It remains to be seen whether the time-series movement of Swedish home ownership can
help explain the 1990s.
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Norway and Canada are potential problems.  Norway has only a modest amount of
unemployment but on the face of it a large amount of owner-occupation.  However, as noted
beneath Table 3 and following McCrone and Stephens (1995), pure owner-occupation in Norway
is a more normal 60% ( excluding cooperatives).  The Canadian case is less easily explained.  In
the latter part of the period, it does not appear to fit the story especially well. 
In 1960, mean unemployment in the countries in the sample was approximately 3% and the
mean home-ownership rate was approximately 46%.  In 1990, mean unemployment was 8.5% and
the owner-occupation rate had reached 62%.  The numbers in the paper would then ascribe more
than half of the OECD's unemployment rise to home-ownership.  If the relation between
unemployment and home-ownership were convex (so that it became dangerous to approach 80%
owner-occupation, say), which, though it has not been explored here, some of the evidence can
support, the estimated effect would be somewhat greater. 
8  .    Conclusions   
This paper is an attempt to explain the high unemployment rates of the industrialized
nations.  The paper's conjecture is that the rise in joblessness has been caused in part by the
increase in home ownership and the decline of the private rental market.  Evidence is given for a
range of countries, the states of the US, and the regions of the UK, Italy, Sweden and France. 
If home ownership reduces workers' mobility, it might thereby raise the equilibrium rate of
unemployment.  This theoretical idea is a simple one.  Assembling a convincing empirical case is
less straightforward.  Some elementary facts, however, seem to be on the side of the paper'
argument.  At the time of writing, in 1996, Spain, Ireland and Finland have the highest
unemployment rates in the Western world.  These countries also have approximately the highest
proportions of home ownership.  Switzerland has the lowest unemployment rate in Europe.  It has
the smallest amount of home ownership.  In the 1960s, North America had the greatest proportion
of people unemployed.  At that time, it had the highest concentration of owner-occupied housing in
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the industrialized world.  From the 1960s to the present day, the US and Switzerland are unusual
in that they have had little or no increase in home ownership.  They have had almost no rise in
unemployment. 
These kinds of statistical patterns are also found, the paper shows, in international
correlations of changes.  This is encouraging, because country fixed-effects are differenced out in
such work.  The same basic correlation emerges in regional data.  Nevetheless, these kinds of
patterns are not in themselves more than mildly suggestive.  With da a of this sort, spurious
correlations are common.       
Perhaps the most persuasive piece of evidence comes from an examination of the estimated
gradient of the function linking unemployment to home ownership (du/dh).  It is approximately the
same in different settings.  The key estimates are as follows.
   Form     of     data      du/dh   
Cross-section of countries in the 1960s 0.14
Cross-section of countries in the 1990s 0.22
Cross-section of countries' 20-year changes0.19
Cross-section of UK regions' 20-year changes0.22
Cross-section of US states' 20-year changes0.13
Cross-section of the regions of France: 1990s.12
Cross-section of the regions of Sweden: 1990s0.15
Cross-section of the regions of Italy: 1990s0.14
Panel estimation of UK regions, 1970s-1990s0.20
Panel estimation of US states, 1986-1995 0.21
While the smallness of data sets in this kind of research makes inference difficult, the similarity of
these coefficients eems of interest.  Corroborative vidence comes from male employment-
population ratios.  For example, in both an international 1990 single cross-section and a set of
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1970-90 nations' changes, the gradient of employment/population with respect to home-ownership
is -0.3.
The results in the paper should be treated as exploratory rather than definitive.
Nevertheless, they are consistent with large effects.  A 10 percentage point rise in owner-
occupation is associated, according to these calculations, with approximately a 2 percentage point
increase in the unemployment rate.  If such an estimate proved correct, it would account for a
considerable part of the secular rise in joblessness in the industrialized nations.  This explanation
has not, to my knowledge, been considered by other economists.  It may deserve attention.
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Figure 1
Unemployment and Home-Ownership across Countries in the 1960s
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The countries covered here are Canada, Ireland, USA, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Denmark, UK,
France, Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland.  The owner-occupation rates are taken partly from
the UN Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics, and partly from information kindly
supplied to me by Mr Mark Stephens of the Unversity of Glasgow Centre for Housing Research
and Urban Studies.  The unemployment rates are taken from p.526 of Layard, Nickell and
Jackman (1991).
'Home-owners' throughout the paper is taken to mean owner-occupiers.
     Note   
There is an owner-occupation figure for Finland for 1960 in the UN Statistical Yearbook.  The difficulty with this is
knowing what unemployment rate to combine with it.  Page 204 of OECD Employment Outlook, July 1995,
reveals that in 1973 Finland had the lowest male employment/population ratio -- only 78% -- of the 22 countries on
which data are given.  This suggests unusually high 'unemployment'.  However, Layard, Nickell and Jackman's
Table A3 on p.526 records an unemployment figure for Finland at the start of the 1970s of approximately 2%,
which was relatively low even in the 1960s.  I have omitted Finland from the Figure.
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Table 1
Unemployment and Owner-Occupation Data
(from Figure 1)
   Country      c.1960 unemployment rate      c.1960 owner-occupation rate   
Canada 6.3 66
Ireland 5.6 59.8
USA 5.3 61.9
Italy 4.4 45.8
Belgium 3.4 49.7
Spain 2.5 51
Denmark 2.4 45
UK 2.2 42
France 1.8 42.7
NL 1.2 25.7
Germany 1.1 29.4
Switzerland 0.4 33.7
Table 2
Other Correlates Suggested in the Literature
   Country     'Corporatism' rank      Standardized benefit replacement       U ion density   
  from Calmfors-Driffil        ratio from OECD (1994)      circa  1960s   
Canada4 22.1 0.28
Ireland12 16.8 0.31
USA 5 7.1 0.28
Italy 11 4.0 0.32
Belgium 14 42.2 0.68
Spain 16 9.4 n/a
Denmark 2 19.5 0.53
UK 12 24.0 0.46
France16 24.6 0.20
NL 13 13.2 0.36
Germany 9 30.4 0.32
Switzerland 6 1.6 0.29
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Figure 2
Cross-Section Correlation Between Home-Ownership and Unemployment:
Countries in the 1990s
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The countries covered in the figure are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, West
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.  The unemployment data here are the standardized OECD
rates from p.204 of OECD Employment Outlook, July 1995.  The home-ownership rates are from
the Glasgow Centre for Housing Studies, the Council of Mortgage Lenders, and the UN Annual
Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics, 1992.
The outlier at 78% unemployment and 5.9% unemployment is Norway.  Its data are open to
debate: see Notes to Table 3.
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Table 3
Unemployment and Owner-Occupation Data
(from Figure 2)
Country Employment/Pop Standardized unem. Home owner %
ratio (males) in 1992 % in 1992 c.1990
Australia 75.7 10.7 70
Austria 77.8 54
Belgium 67.3 7.7 65
Canada 69.5 11.3 63
Denmark 80.7 55
Finland 66.6 13.0 78
France 68.5 10.4 56
W. Germany 74.0 4.6 42
Greece 69.1 79
Ireland 67.8 15.5 76
Italy 72.9 10.5 68
Japan 87.8 2.2 59
Luxembg. 76.8 68
Netherlands 76.5 5.6 45
N. Zealand 74.0 10.4 71*
Norway 77.3 5.9 60/78
Portugal 79.4 4.1 58
Spain 64.6 18.1 75
Sweden 76.7 4.8 43/56
Switzerland 91.4 2.9 28
UK 73.6 10.1 65
US 78.8 7.3 64
     Notes   
Norway and Sweden have two numbers.  In each case, the second and larger number includes "co-
ownership or ownership cooperatives".  The first number is pure owner-occupation in the sense of
McCrone and Stephens (1995).  These are low-unemployment countries.  All the calculations in
the paper are deliberately done with the second and larger home-ownership numbers, because this
is the approach that is intrinsically less favourable to the paper's thesis.
*This is the 1981 figure because of missing comparable data.  Sources are as in Figure 2.
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Figure 3
The Cross-Section Correlation Between Home-Ownership and (Male)
Employment-to-Population Ratios: The 1990s
80706050403020
60
70
80
90
100
Home ownership rate c.1990
E
m
p
l/
p
o
p
 r
a
ti
o
 (
m
a
le
s)
 1
9
9
2
y = 94.992 - 0.32268x   R^2 = 0.389
The countries covered in the figure are Australia , Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, West Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.
The outlier in the top north-west corner is Switzerland.  However, the next figure shows that the
estimated gradient is not especially sensitive to the removal of this observation.
The outlier at 78% unemployment and 5.9% unemployment is Norway.  Its data are open to
debate: see Notes to Table 3.
Source for the employment/population data: OECD Employment Outlook, July 1995.
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Figure 4
The Previous Figure without Switzerland
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Sources are as in Figure 3.
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Figure 5
The Correlation Between the Increase in Owner-Occupation
and Decline in (Male) Employment/Population: 18 Countries
 from the 1970s-1990s
3020100
0
10
20
30
Rise in Home Owner % 70s-90s
D
e
c
li
n
e
 i
n
 E
m
p
/P
o
p
 1
9
7
0
s
-9
0
s y = 8.5049 + 0.30748x   R^2 = 0.142
The axes are 20-year changes, that is, they take the 1990 figure minus the 1970 figure.  The
vertical axis is decline (that is, the negative of the 90-70 figure).
These countries are Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Norway, Switzerland, USA, Denmark,
France, Netherlands, UK, Japan, Canada, Spain, Germany, Australia, Italy.  The owner
occupation figures are from the      UN Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics  ,1992, the
     UN Statistical Yearbooks   and     UN World Housing Survey   , 1974, and    Social Indicators for the
   European Community 1960-78   , p146.  The 1970s years for some countries vary from 1968 to
1972.  Most are for 1970.  The source of the employment data is the OECD Employment Outlook,
July 1995, p.204.
The outlier in the south-east corner is Norway.
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Figure 6
The Correlation Between the Change in Unemployment and Change in
Home-Ownership: 18 Countries from the 1970s-1990s
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The axes are 20-year changes, that is, they take the 1990 figure minus the 1970 figure.
The countries are Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Norway, Switzerland, USA, Denmark,
France, Netherlands, UK, Japan, Ireland, Canada, Spain, Germany, Australia, Italy.
The graph plots changes in the unemployment % and owner-occupation % from the 1970s to the
1990s.  The data are in numbers of percentage points.  In two cases -- Japan and Canada -- figures
from the 1980s had to be used instead of the 1990s.  The unemployment changes are Layard,
Nickell and Jackman figures for 1969/73 to 1986/90.  The owner occupation figures are from the
     UN Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics  ,1992, the     UN Statistical Yearbooks   and
     UN World Housing Survey   , 1974, and    Social Indicators for the European Community 1960-78   ,
p146.
The outlier in the south-east corner is Norway.
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Figure 7
The Correlation Between Changes in Unemployment and
Owner-Occupation: The US States 1970-1990s
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The axes are 20-year changes, that is, they take the 1990 value minus the 1970 value.  The data are
for the 51 states of the US.  The coefficient on the owner occupation variable is statistically
significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
     Notes   
The source of the data is the    Statistical Abstract of the US   , 1993, Labor Statistics.
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Figure 8
The Cross-Section Correlation Between Unemployment Changes and Owner-
Occupation Changes: The UK Regions 1970s-90s.
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The axes are 20-year changes, that is, they take the 1990 figure minus the 1971 figure.  The
regions are Greater London, Rest of South-East, East Anglia, South West, West Midlands, East
Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside, North West, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland.  In the
case of Greater London and Rest of South-East, it was not possible to get exactly comparable
figures, so the change for both unemployment and owner occupation is taken, for these two
regions only, to be the 1990-1975 change.
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Table 4
Fixed Effects Estimates: State-level US Unemployment Regressions with Housing
Owner-Occupation as an Independent Variable, 1986-1995.
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Dependent variable Ut is unemployment in percentage points
as a level or log; home ownership, ht, is in levels.  The equations do not instrument the lagged
dependent variable with itself lagged; doing so and estimating with GMM made only a slight
difference to the results.
Eqn 1 Eqn 2
# of observations 510 510
# of states 51 51
Dependent variable Ut ln Ut
Regressors
Ut-1 0.7527
(0.0301)
ln Ut-1 0.7719
(0.0305)
ht 0.0029 -0.0030
(0.0273) (0.0048)
ht-1 -0.0001 0.0023
(0.0329) (0.0057)
ht-2 0.0490 0.0096
(0.0266) (0.0046)
State dummies yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
Implied long-run h coefficient 0.205 n/a
F(13, 446) 86.00 [p = 0.000] 84.33[p = 0.000]
F(50, 446) 1.052[p = 0.382] 1.229[p = 0.145]
Notes
F(13, 446) is a joint test of the insignificance of the explanatory variables.
F(50, 446) is a joint test of the insignificance of the state dummies.
_________________________________________________________________________
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Table 5
Fixed Effects Estimates: Region-level UK Unemployment Regressions with
Proportion of Housing Privately Rented as an Independent Variable, 1973-1994.
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Dependent variable Ut is unemployment in percentage points
as a level or log; private sector renting, rt, is in levels.
Eqn 1 Eqn 2
# of observations 244 244
# of regions 13 13
Dependent variable Ut Ut
Regressors
Ut-1 1.6048 -0.7337
(0.0570) (0.0542)
Ut-2 -0.7719 1.5730
(0.0540) (0.0539)
rt -0.0357 0.0604
(0.0273) (0.0425)
rt-1 -0.1243
(0.0423)
Region dummies yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
Implied long-run r coefficient -0.213 -0.398
F1 814.65 839.47
F2 3.02 3.21
Notes
F1 is a joint test of the insignificance of the explanatory variables.
F2 is a joint test of the insignificance of the region dummies.
_________________________________________________________________________
Notes
Private sector renting figures were kindly supplied by the Department of the Environment.  The regional
unemployment figures are from Roberts (1996).  The thirteen regions are North, Yorkshire and Humberside, East
Midlands, East Anglia, South East, Greater London, South East excluding London, South West, West Midlands,
North West, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland.  There is no 1994 observation available for Northern Ireland.
Because of missing data: (i) for years before 1983 it has had to be assumed that the proportion of houses rented from
Housing Associations remained at 1983 levels, and (ii) the 1973-75 private renting figures for Greater London and
the South East excluding London have had to be calculated by extrapolation.
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Figure 9
The Cross-Section Correlation for the Regions of France in the 1990s  
Source:    Eurostat Statistical Yearbook   
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Regions are Ile de France, Champagne-Ardenne, Picardie, Haute-Normandie, Centre, Basse-
Normandie, Bourgogne, Nord Pas de Calais, Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comte, Pays de la Loix,
Bretagne, Poiton-Charentes, Aquitaine, Mid Pyrenees, Limousin, Rhones-Alpes, Auvergne,
Languedoc-Roussillon, Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur, Corse.
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Figure 10
 The Cross-Section Correlation for the Regions of Italy in the 1990s  
Source:    Eurostat Statistical Yearbook   
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The regions here are Piemonte, Valee d'Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia, Trentino-Alto Adigie, Veneto,
Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio, Abruzzi, Molise,
Campania, Puglia, Bailicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna.
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Figure 11
The Cross-Section Correlation for the Regions of Sweden in the 1990s
Source:    Eurostat Statistical Yearbook   
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The regions covered here are Stockholm; Ostra Mellansverige; Smaland me oarna; Sydsverige;
Vastverige; Norra Mellansverige; Mellersta Norrland; Ovre Norrland.
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Figure 12
The UK Regional Correlation Between the  Unemployment
Rate and the Proportion of Private Renters in the 1990s
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The regions here are North, Yorkshire and Humberside, East Midlands, East Anglia, Greater
London, South-East excluding Greater London, South West, West Midlands, North West, Wales,
Scotland and Northern Ireland.  The rental data were kindly supplied by the Department of
Environment.
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Appendix
   An Illustration of the Collapse of a Rented
     Housing Market: The Case of Britain  
The end of the First World War saw the introduction of the Rent and Mortgage Interest
Restriction Act of 1915.  This fixed rents, gave tenants security against eviction, and restricted
mortgage interest rates.  The Housing Acts of 1919 and 1923 introduced subsidies to private
builders and on houses built for private owners.  In 1938 there were 11 million dwellings in
England and Wales, of which 32% were owner-occupied, 10% were rented from the public sector
and 58% were privately rented.
After World War Two there was initially little private building but much public building.  In
1948, for example, 33,000 private houses were completed while 195,000 were built by the public
sector.  In 1949 a housing act removed the requirement that local authorities concentrate on
providing homes only for the working class.  In 1954, the private sector built 91,000 homes and
the public sector 257,000.  In 1957 the Rent Act freed most privately owned homes from rent
control.  By 1960 public sector housing accounted for a quarter of Britons.  The private rented
sector continued to decline through the 1960s.
In 1974 the Labour government introduced a new Rent Act which provided more security
to those lived in furnished rented accomodation.  A 1977 green paper (Housing Policy) strongly
supported the trend towards home ownership.  It recommended that more local authority homes be
provided to make up for the decline in private renting.
A right-to-buy policy was introduced by the Conservative government that was elected in
1979.  This was implemented mainly in the Housing Act of 1990.  Public sector tenants were
given security of tenure.  Fixed-term rental contracts were encouraged in the private sector.  There
were further grants to owner-occupiers.  A 1987 white paper continued to recommend expansion
of home ownership.
By the early 1990s, the owner-occupation rate had reached approximately 70%, compared
to 29% in 1950.  The privately-rented proportion of homes had thus declined from 53% in 1950 to
less than 10% at the start of the 1990s.
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Figure A1
UK Time-Series of Owner-Occupied % and Unemployment %
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The home ownership data come from Table G1 p.185 of    A Compendium of Building Society   
   Statistics   , 8th Edition.  They are for Great Britain.
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Figure A2
The Decline of the Privately-Rented Housing Sector in Great Britain
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The data come from Table G1, p.185, of    A Compendium of Building Society Statistics   , 8th
Edition, published by The Building Societies Association.
     Note   
Early data from the UK Council of Mortgage Lenders show:
   Year      Owner-Occupied Dwellings %                 Public-sector rented %            Private-sector rented %    
1938 32 10 58
1951 31 17 52
1960 44 25 32
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